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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Plaintiff Vietta Steel sued the defendant, Robert
Breinholt, dba Aspen Care Center, for damages arising from
her arrest for trespass at the Aspen Care Center on October
22, 1984 after the criminal charge was dismissed against her
in November, 1984 because there was insufficient

evidence

for a prosecution.

Her civil complaint alleged causes of

acts

prosecution;

for

malicious

imprisionment;

and

a tort

abuse

of outrage

of

process;

as set out

false
in the

Restatement (2nd) of Torts, §46.
The trial court instructed the jury that if plaintiff had committed a criminal trespass she could not recover
against the defendant under theories of malicious prosecution, abuse of process or false imprisionment regardless of
defendant's motive in having her arrested.

The trial judge

refused, however, to instruct the jury that under Section
76-6-206(4) plaintiff was not guilty of trespass if:
(a) that the property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained and
(b) the actor's conduct did not substantially interfer with the owners use of the
property.
The failure to so instruct was prejudicial error.

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of the Nature of the Case
Plaintiff Vietta Steele appeals to this court for
an order granting her a new trial due to the trial courts
failure to properly instruct the jury on the legal defense
to the charge of criminal trespass.
Disposition of Case in Lower Court
Trial was held on May 27, through 30, 1986 before
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist sitting with a jury.

The

jury found no cause of action by plaintiff against defendant
and awarded no damages in the case.

Plaintiff's Complaint

was accordingly dismissed.
Statement of Facts
Plaintiff Vietta Steele was an old friend of a man
named Zenon Domper.

They met in 1968 when both worked at

the Defense Depot, Ogden.

A friendship developed and Mr.

Domper was thereafter a frequent quest in the Steele household.

(TR.5f R.612)

Later when confined

in a nursing

home, the Steeles were frequent and regular visitors with
Mr. Dompor through June, 1984.
In June 1970, Mr. Domper suffered a stroke.

At his

request and through his personal attorney Pete Vlahos, Mrs.
Steele was appointed his legal guardian.

(TR.6, R.613)

served

(5) years and her

in that capacity for about five

husband did so for another year.

1

She

Thereafter Mr. Domperfs

financial affairs were turned over to the First Security
BanK where they remained until his death.

(TR.9, R.616)

In late 1983, Mrs. Steele learned of money being
given by Mr. Domper to employees of the Aspen Care Center in
excess of normal nursing home expenses.

She felt that gifts

of $300.00 to $500.00 to nursing home employees were inappropriate due to the possibility of coercion or undue influence on Mr. Domper by Aspen Care Center employees.

She made

complaint to the Veteran's Administration and the State of
Utah.

(TR.11-14, R.618-621)
Aspen Care Center was notified of these complaints

around the month of January or early February, 1984 (TR.314,
R.921).
an

In March, 1984 Mr. Domper allegedly wanted to see

attorney

believed
affairs.

about

terminating

Mrs. Steele

possessed

a

Power

of

concerning

Attorney
his

he

financial

Attorney Burt Havas was contacted by the Care

Center (TR.289, R.896).

Mr. Havas had previously worked for

the Care Center but did not know Mr. Domper (TR.277, R.884).
There had been no effort made by Care Center employees to
contact

Mr.

Domper's

personal

standing, attorney Pete Vlahos.

attorney

of

many

years

As a result of Mr. Havas1

meeting with Mr. Domper, a letter was sent by Mr. Havas to
Mrs.

Steele terminating the Power of Attorney which in fact

never existed (TR.277, R.884).
On June

21, 1984, Mrs. Steele received another

2

letter from Attorney Havas demanding that she not see Mr.
Domper or attempt to do so in the future or a restraining
order would be obtained.

Mr. Domper did not authorize or

request that this letter be sent

(TR.295, R.902).

Rather,

it was generated at the request of the Care Center.

At the

same time instructions were given Aspen Care Center
Mrs.

Steele was not to visit Mr. Domper

minutes at a time.

These latter

that

for more than 30

instructions again came

from Mr. Havas.
Mrs. Steele stayed away from the Care Center until
late 1984 although she remained in contact with Care Center
employees, specifically Steven Anderson, receiving reports
about Mr. Domper's health.

(TR.275, R.882)

In late September,
Domper

in

the

company

1984 Mrs. Steele

of

Robert

Administration

specialist

employed

Department

Employment

Security

of

by

Lowe

visited Mr.
a

the State

Veteran's
of Utah,

(TR.132, R.739).

Mr.

Domper appeared glad to see them and appreciative of their
visit (TR.135, R.742).
learned

Around October 21, 1984 Mrs. Steele

that Mr. Domper's health was deteriorating so she

went to visit Mr. Domper in the company of her friend, Anna
Holman who was also acquainted with Mr. Domper.
Mr. Domper

She found

in poor physical health and dressed in a dirty

soiled shirt.

She and Mrs. Holman changed the shirt while

visiting with Mr. Domper.

Again Mr. Domper seemed apprecia-
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tive of the visit (TR.151-52, R.758-759).
Alarmed at Mr. Domper's condition, early the next
morning

(a

Monday)

Mrs.

Steele

called

Administration Hospital in Salt Lake City.

the

Veteran's

She was referred

again to Robert Lowe who she spoke to by telephone.

She

informed

Mr.

Mr.

Lowe

Domper's condition

that

she

was

very

(TR.138, R.745).

Veteran's

Administration

in

instructed

to tell Mrs. Steele

alarmed

Mr. Lowe contacted the

Salt

Lake

City

could

immediately.

then

bring Mr. Domper

(TR.139,

R.746).

instructions to Mrs. Steele.
After

receiving

and

was

to go see Mr. Domper

inquire whether he wanted to go to the hospital.
Mrs. Steele

about

Mr.

and

If he did,

to the hospital

Lowe

relayed

these

(TR.139-40, R.746-747).

these

instruction

from Mr. Lowe,

Mrs. Steele and her husband went to the Aspen Care Center.
Mrs. Steele had a pocket tape recorder in her purse.
turned
Center.

She

it on as she got out of her car to enter the Care
The tape recording (R.218) is an important piece of

evidence because it contains no evidence of any disturbance
or

unreasonable

conduct

on

the part

of Mrs. Steele

from

which it can be concluded that she in any way substantially
interferred

with

the

defendant's

operation

of

its

Care

Center.
When Mrs. Steele and her husband entered the Care
Center, Mr. Domper was in a wheelchair in the lobby (TR.159,

4

R.766-767).

Mr. Steele asked Mr. Domper if he wanted to go

to the Veteran's Administration Hospital and he nodded yes
(TR.160, R.767).
While Mr. Steele was speaking to Mr. Domper, a
woman

arrived

Steele.

and

asked Mrs. Steele

if she was Vietta

Receiving an affirmative answer the woman (Jolene

Hill) told Mrs. Steele that she could not be in the facility
because there was a restraining order in existance prohibiting her presence in the Care Center.

Mrs. Steele requested

that she be shown the order. None could be produced because
none existed.
A second employee, Debra Hill, was called to the
front office area.

She wheeled Mr. Domper out of the lobby.

When Debra Hill learned that Mrs. Steele was present she
called Salt Lake City.
the bookkeeper

for the Aspen Care Center.

instructed Debra Hill
trespass.

She spoke to a Pamela Bues who was
Pamela Bues

to have Mrs. Steele arrested for

It was the intent of Pamela Bues that the arrest

be used to get Mrs. Steele out of the facility.
R.846).

(TR.239,

There was no intent at any time that Mrs. Steele be

prosecuted for criminal trespass, rather that the arrest
process simply be used as a vehicle to remove her from the
facility on that particular day.
The Ogden City Police were called with Officer Ann
Grotegut responding.

It was the testimony of the two Care

5

Center employees and Officer Grotegut that Mrs. Steele was
asked

to leave

arrested.

the premises

voluntarily

or she would

be

It was the testimony of Mrs. Steele and her hus-

band that she was never asked to voluntarily leave the facility before she was placed under arrest.
Mrs. Steele was then placed under arrest by Officer
Grotegut, transported the Weber County Jail and there booked
into that facility.

She was searched, her mug shot and fin-

gerprints obtained.

She remained in jail for approximately

an

hour

and

recognizance.

a half

before

she

released

on

her

own

She was directed to appear in Circuit Court

in November, 1984.

She hired attorney Don Sharp to defend

her on the criminal charge.
criminal

was

trespass

charge

On the day set for trial the

was dismissed

insufficient evidence to proceed.

because

there was

Actually the Car Center

had been contacted and declined prosecution.
Four

days

Aspen Care Center

following Mrs. Steele's
on October

arrest

at the

22, 1984 Mr. Domper's whose

deteriorating health Mrs. Steele had been gravely concerned
about, died at the Aspen Care Center.
Following

the testimony at trial and over plain-

tiff's objections, Judge Wahlquist instructed the jury that
Mrs. Steele could not recover in the case under theories of
malicious prosecution, abusive process or false

imprision-

ment if she was at the time of her arrest guilty of criminal

6

trespass regardless of the defendant's intent or motive in
having her arrested or using the criminal process only to
obtain her removal from the Care Center Facility on October
22, 1984.

The trial court refused to instruct the jury that

it is a defense to the charge of criminal trespass that the
facility was open to the public when Mrs. Steele entered or
remained
tially

in the building and her conduct did not substan-

interfer with the defendant's use and operation of

the Care Center.
The pertinent instruction given by the court is set
out in the explanation on pages 194 and 195 of the record.
It states:
The plaintiff here alleges that the agents
of the defendant lack both proper motive,
that is, acting with malice, and acted also
without probable cause, that is a reasonable basis for the belief that she had committed criminal trespass.
The defendant
denies these allegations.
The defendant
further alleges that the plaintiff is in
fact guilty of the charge.
The law provides that persons should be encouraged to
bring criminal offenders to justice, and
does not intend to reward guilty people
with civil judgment, and, therefore, guilty
persons should not recover for any of the
first three civil wrongs here alleged, such
as malicious prosecution, abusive process,
false arrest or imprisonment. If she is in
fact guilty of criminal trespass, she cannot recover under any of the first three
theories or questions here presented, and
the answer to each question should be "no".
For this defense to come into play, the
defendant must prove by at least a preponderance of the evidence the elements of
that offense. The elements are as follows:
(1) That the plaintiff entered or remained
on the defendants premises; and (2) did so
after she was reasonably informed that she
was requested not to enter, or remain.

7

Plaintiff's objections to that portion of the jury
instructions are set out

in the record at pages 928-939,

(TR.321-332).
Summary of Argument
The trial court improperly refused to instruct the
jury that it is a defense to the criminal charge of trespass
that the property in question was open to the public when
plaintiff entered or remained in the Care Center and plaintiff's

conduct

defendant's

did

use

not

of

76-6-206(4), UCA.

substantially

the

property

interfere

pursuant

to

with

the

Section

This is a factual issue under the crimi-

nal trespass section of the Code and should have been submitted to the Jury.
ARGUMENT
There
perimeters of

are

no

cases

the meaning

in

Utah

which

or application

contained in Section 76-6-206(4),

of

discuss
the

the

language

A logical interpretation

of that statutory language, however, is that the legislature
recognized

that circumstances may occur in which a person

has a legitmate reason for remaining on property or refusing
to leave when demanded to so do, and that the criminal trespass statute cannot be used as a pretext in those circumstances to obtain the otherwise improper removal of another
from the premises.
The primary reason advanced by the trial court for

8

failing

to

instruct

the

jury

concerning

the

statutory

defense to criminal trespass set out in the statute was the
trial judge's opinion that the statute must only refer to a
public

building,

county

or

owned

facility

state

for

example

office

a

building

otherwise

open

court

house,

rather

than

to

the

municipal,
a privately

public

(TR.328,

R.935) .
There was no question in this case that the Care
Center was open to the public when plaintiff entered.

The

deposition of the defendant is pertinent:
Q: The nursing home facilities, or specifically Aspen Care, do they maintain visiting hours or open visiting with people?
A: It's open visitation. People can come
visit the patients there most any time
that's a reasonable hour.
Q: Is the facility generally then open to
the public for visitation purposes like
that?
A:
Well, in the sense that visitors are
welcome at any hour it is. It's not generally open to the public who have no purpose
for being there.
(Brienholt Depo. P. 29,
R.594)
Q:
Now, the Aspen Care Center, do you
consider it as open to the public?
A: Well, it's private property. And it's
open to people who have a purpose for being
there for. . . . and it's also open to
patient visitors whom the patient would
want. (TR.306, R.913)
Clearly a nursing home is a quasi-public facility
in the sense that anyone who has a legitimate purpose in

9

visiting or confiring with a patient may enter at any hour.
Mrs. Steele's sole purpose in going to the Care Center on
October

22,

1984

was

her

legitimate

Domper's deteriorating health.

concern

about

Mr.

Absent a restraining order

preventing her from entering the factility, she was legally
entitled to do so.

Assuming she was asked to leave the pre-

mises before she was placed under arrest, which is disputed,
was her refusal justified by her concern for Mr. Domper's
health?

She was a friend of many years standing, familiar

with Mrs. Domper's physical condition and appearance; had
received

word

that Mr. Domper's health was deteriorating;

had verified that information through her own observation on
the previous day; and had been so concerned that she felt it
necessary to try and obtain immediate hospital care; and in
fact he died four days later.

Those facts would certainly

seem to lend the air of legitimacy to her presence at the
Care Center on October 22, 1984.
From a social standpoint, the elderly who are physically or mentally

infirm are routinely placed

care facilities like Aspen Care Center.

in nursing

The elderly them-

selves may be too ill or too dependant or too scarred to
themselves monitor

the care or conduct of a nursing home

facility to be assured that they are receiving proper care
or

treatment.

Therefore, the obligation of

scruitinizing

that care and conduct must fall on friends and relatives of

10

the patient.

In that circumstance if there is a legitimate

belief that the medical treatment a patient is receiving is
inadequate and the need for additional care immediate that
concern should

not

be capable of defeat via the criminal

trespass statute simply because a person is asked to leave a
facility and if she or he refuses can be placed under arrest
and removed.
the

At that point a more searching inquiry into

facts, as via

a hearing

on

request

for

a

temporary

restraining order would certainly seem preferable and more
appropriate than resort to a pretext arrest under the trespass statute.
There

is

extremely

little

lav^ on

this

subject.

Utah has no statute guaranteeing access to a patient in a
nursing care facility.
dealing with
Nursing

There have been some limited cases

this subject matter.

Home

Law

contained

in

These are set out in
Chapter

5,

Access

to

Facilities, attached hereto as Appendix 1 and referred to in
the case of Rabbi Samuel Teitelbaum
Diehl,

plaintiffs,

Nursing
District

Home,
Court

v.

Civil
in

Theordore
No.

and

for

79-199

and Larry and Louise

Sorensony
in

the

the District

dba
United

Waitwell
States

of Arizona,

the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order granting
preliminary injunction, a copy of which is attached hereto
as Appendix 2.
The remaining question involved is whether or not

11

Mrs.

Steele's

presence

at

the

nursing

care

factility

substantially interferred with the defendant's use and operation of that facility during her presence in the Aspen Care
lobby.

This would appear to be a purely factual question

for determination by the jury and if it concluded that the
purpose of her visit was legitimate and she was not behaving
in an unreasonable manner would have permitted the jury to
find that despite a request to leave the premises, if in
fact such a request was made, a refusal to do so was proper
under the circumstances, thereby permitting her to recover
under her theories of malicious prosecution, abuse of process or false arrest and imprisonment.

Having received only

an instruction that a criminal trespass occurred if Mrs.
Steele was asked to leave and declined to do so, or simply
remained on the premises the jury was erroneously instructed
and

the error was completely prejudicial to plaintiff's

first three causes of action.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erroneously failed to instruct the
jury on the statutory defense to criminal trespass and this
error was prejudicial requiring an Order be entered granting
plaintiff a new trial.

*

DATED this <Z?f nj day of September, 1986.
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN
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CHAPTERS NVitSiMG i-io-u^
ACCESS TO FACILITIES

5.1 THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS
Access to nursing homes by members of the public is an
issue of renewed concern to residents' advocates. Effective
advocacy is usually not possible unless advocates are
physically able to enter nursing homes to visit and meet
with residentSo
In the early 1970s, several cases were brought by community groups seeking entry into nursing homes.' Prompt
settlement of the early litigation, giving plaintiffs the access theyvspught, led to little serious development of case
law in this area.
*
Recently, attention has again been focused on the problem of access, as nursing homes have begun to close their
doors to advocates. An advocate in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for example, was convicted of criminal trespass for
visiting a disabled friend after being advised that her
"privilege" to visit had been revoked by the facility.2 Other
advocates have also been physically barred at the door and
told not to enter. Still others face a new series of restrictions on the access they are "given." For example:
• Residents may be visited only if a staff person is present;
• Only certain issues may be discussed;
• No photographs may be taken; and
• No reports may be issued unless they are first
cleared with the facility's administration.
Access to facilities by residents' invited guests is not
usually a problem. A resident may generally see and visit
with persons of his/her own choice. Exceptions may arise if
the resident is under guardianship or conservatorship or in
instances in which local law permits a particular visitor to
be barred as "medically contraindicated."
More difficult access issues arise:
• When the resident, because of mental and/or
physical infirmities, is unable to communicate
his/her wishes to see particular visitors in a manner
readily understood by others; and
• When the resident is initially unaware of the existence of an outside advocate and contact between
them is initiated by the advocate.

1

2

Citizens for Better Care v. Alden Care Enterprises,
Inc.. No. 72-214876, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 687 (Mar.
1973) (Clearinghouse No. 9.505) (Cir. Ct. Mich., filed
Aug. 11,1972); Health Law Project v. Sarah Allen Nursing Home, No. 71-17195, (Clearinghouse No. 6,177)
(E.D. Pa., filed July 20,1971) (stipulation entered Aug.
13,1971).
State v. Hoyt, No. 1021885 (Mun. Ct. Minn, First Div.,
July 5, 1979), aff'd. No. 73573 (Dist C t Minn., Fourth
Jud. Dist., Dec 11, 1979), rev'd on appeal, No. 50889
(Minn., Apr. 14, 1981). The reversal of Hoyt's conviction occurred nearly two years after the conviction.
Hoyt was barred from the facility for the entire intervening period.

To secure full and free access to facilities in these situations, administrative advocacy and litigation should be used. In addition, legislation at both the federal and state
levels is appropriate and necessary.

5.2

ESTABLISHING RIGHTS OF ACCESS

5.2.1

ADMINISTRATIVE ADVOCACY

An administrative complaint* was filed with the Office for
Civil Rights (OCR), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), seeking enforcement of the federal skilled nursing facility regulations,4 of the regulations enforcing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,5and of the
California Long-Term Care Health, Safety and Security Act
of 1973.' The administrative complaint alleged three major
categories of violations:
• Failure to provide adequate resident care;
• Retaliation against and intimidation of residents
and an advocacy group (United Neighbors in Action)
that complained about residents' care; and
• Illegal restrictions on access and on the rights of
speech and association of residents and the advocacy group.
Among other remedies, complainants ask HHS, the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA), and OCR to issue
written guidelines for skilled nursing facilities that
clearly set forth patients' rights to voice and seek
resolution of complaints of patient care violations and
to associate with advocacy organizations, and the
right of advocacy organizations to work toward improving patient care and to have access to facilities in
order to do so.?
OCR's July 20,1981, report of its investigation states that
Section 504's prohibition against intimidatory or retaliatory
acts applies only to rights or privileges secured by the
Rehabilitation Act and not, more generally, to questions
about quality of care. Nevertheless, it requires the facility
to amend its grievance procedure to guarantee access to
advocates:

3

4
5
6

United Neighbors in Action v. Sequoia Manor Convalescent Hospital, Inc., OCR Docket No. 09-80-3074
(Dec. 27, 1979), 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 374 (July 1980)
(Clearinghouse No. 29,300).
42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1101-.1137 (1980).
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), 45 C.F.R Part 84 (1980). See §
6.2.1.1 intra.
22 CAL AOM. COOE §§ 70001-74525 (1972) (§§ 1417-39 of
the CALIFORNIA HEALTH & SAFETY COOE) (1979).
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United Neighbors in Action v. Sequoia Manor Convalescent Hospital, Inc., OCR Docket No. 09-80-3074
(Dec. 27, 1979), 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 374 (July 1980)
(Clearinghouse No. 29,300). Administrative Complaint, Relief V-C-9, at 40.

Citing the state action doctrines of company town12 and
nexus theory,13 the court held that state action was present
in the nominally private facility.
While the court specifically found that plaintiffs' visit to
the facility was not at the request of any resident, it held
that plaintiffs nevertheless enjoyed a constitutionally protected right of access to the facility, that plaintiffs* communication with Waitwell residents is constitutionally protected, and that the facility may only place "reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions" on advocates' visits.14
On August 6,1979 in a judgment, the court permanently
enjoined the facility from "directly or indirectly, interfering,
obstructing or hampering in any manner visits, meetings,
discussions or other communication" between Waitwell
residents and volunteers with the nursing home resident
outreach program.18
In another case, a legal services program, one of its
paralegals, and the husband of a nursing home resident
sued a facility for denying them access.1* The suit alleged
violation of the first and fourteenth amendments and the
federal nursing home Residents' Bill of Rights.17
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that while visiting a client,
the paralegal was approached by another resident regarding a problem at the nursing home. A member of the facility staff interrupted the conversation, telling the paralegal
that he could not speak with the resident because she was
on "'behavior modification"* for being "'a chronic cornplainer which results in disruption to the staff and other
residents."*" The paralegal was unable to speak with the
resident. On subsequent days, during posted visiting hours,
the building was locked and the paralegal could not enter
at all. Another plaintiff complained about the reduction in

ie grievance policy and procedure must include the
ght of (Sequoia Manor Convalescent Hospital] SMCH
•sidents to. have access to persons such as friends,
Natives, lawyers, or representatives of advocacy
roups, who may assist them in making complaints
nder Section 504. Access to assistance must be
nder circumstances which provide for confidentiality
nd reasonable visiting times. Potential complainants
esiring to utilize the grievance procedure may need
uch assistance in order to be notified of their rights or
;ommunicate their concerns because of their hanlicapping condition (e.g., aural or visual impairments,
ipeech impediments). In these circumstances, the
lenial of such assistance would constitute a denial of
iue process.'

5.2.2

LITIGATION BY ADVOCACY
GROUPS

The first amendment rights of members of a community
Ivocacy group to visit nursing home residents on their
vn initiative, without an invitation from the residents,
sre affirmed in Teitelbaum v. Sorenson.9 Volunteers with
e nursing home resident outreach project sponsored by
e Arizona Center for Law in the Public" Interest attempted
> visit a local nursing home to distribute a brochure on
sidents' rights and to discuss with residents a state law
ititling them to a state renter's tax credit or refund. They
ere granted admission only for the purpose of discussing
•sidents' rights. When the nursing home's administrator
rohibited a return visit to discuss the tax law, several
Dlunteers with the project filed suit against the facility.
Asserting that communication between plaintiffs and
ssidents is indisputably protected under the first amendlent, plaintiffs phrased the single issue before the court as
/nether the conduct of the privately owned nursing home
iras under color of law.10

12

In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
'reliminary Injunction, entered July 3,1979, the court found
hat the residents of the facility are elderly and infirm and
hat "their lives are characterized by dependency upon the
lursing home staff and administration."11 The fact of institutionalization, the court concluded, discourages
•esidents from voicing concerns and grievances, thus making independent advocacy essential.

8

9

10
11

13

Letter from Floyd L Pierce, Director, OCR, Region IX
to Steven Ronfeldt, Legal Aid Society of Alameda
County (July 20, 1981) (copy in National Senior
Citizens Law Center (NSCLQ files).
Civ. A. No. 79-199 PHX WEC (D. Ariz., filed Mar. 16,
1979) (permanent injunction issued Aug. 6, 1979).
Plaintiffs were represented by Bruce Meyerson,
Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest. P. 0.
Box 2783, Phoenix, Arizona 85002. July 3.1979 Order
is reproduced in App. 2 Copies of pleadings are in
NSCLC files.
See § 4.2.2.1 supra (discussion of "under color law").
Teitelbaum v. Sorenson. Civ. A. No. 79-199 PHX WEC
(D. Ariz., filed Mar. 16,1979), Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Injunction 1 5 (July 3,
1979) (Appendix 2).

14
15
16

17
18

49

See § 4.2.1.2.3 supra. The court ruled that Waitwell
"provides all necessary services to residents and
they are physically and psychologically isolated from
other community activities." Conclusions of Law at 1
4. Citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and
two migrant labor cases, Mid-Hudson Legal Services,
Inc. v. G & U Inc., 437 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), and
Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich.
1971), the court held that Waitwell is the "functional
equivalent" of a town. Id.
See § 4.2.1.2.2 supra. The court found that there was
"sufficient interdependence between public and
private conduct" to make Waitwell's actions under
color of law. Conclusions of Law at § 4. Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Persuasive indicia of this interdependence are the facts
that Waitwell receives a majority (80%) of its income
from the county for the care of indigent persons, that
Waitwell is "extensively regulated", and that "the duty to provide care for indigent persons is a public
function under Arizona law." Conclusions of Law at
14.
Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, Civ. A. No. 79-199 PHX WEC
(D. Ariz., filed Mar. 16, 1979), Preliminary Injunction
Order 1 2.
Id., Judgment (Aug. 6,1979). Plaintiffs are entitled to
attorneys' fees. Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d
1248 (9th Cir. 1981).
Legal Services Corp. of Iowa v. Bladister, Inc., Civ. A.
No. 80-263-C, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 770 (Nov. 1980)
(Clearinghouse No. 29,916) (S.D. Iowa, filed June 24,
1980).
42 C.F.R. § 442.311 (1980).
Legal Services Corp. of Iowa v. Bladister, Inc., Civ. A.
No. 80-263-C, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 770 (Nov. 1980)
(Clearinghouse No. 29,916) (S.D. Iowa, filed June 24,
1980), Amended and Substituted Complaint 1 39 (Nov.
18,1980) (quoting the staff member).
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visiting hours from 12 hours (8 a.m. to 8 p.m.) to 7 hours (12
noon to 7 p.m.), which limited the time he could spend with
his wife, who was a resident.
On November 18,1980, the district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that there was no state
action under the theory of joint venturer,™ nexus," affirmative approval," delegation of statutory public function,"
or delegation of traditional state function."3Plaintiffs then
filed a motion to amend the judgment and to amend the
complaint, which the court granted on January 22,1981 , M
The court found two sets of factual allegations in the
amended complaint sufficient to indicate state action in
the pleadings state of the civil rights litigation.
First, plaintiffs alleged that under the state's civil penalty
system, violations of regulations relating to freedom of
association between residents and visitors constituted
class HI violations, but that the state imposed no fine for
class HI violations.29
The court said that this state law might serve to make the
state a joint venturer with the facility. The court described
plaintiffs' affirmative allegation
that the state has lent its approval to the challenged
restriction of visiting hours through its failure to implement an enforcement mechanism designed to deter
violations of statutory and regulatory provisions which
mandate the protection of rights of access of nursing
home residents. In this manner, plaintiffs have pointed
to specific state laws which could be deemed to have
sanctioned the offending conduct for purposes of imputing such conduct to the state under the joint venturer doctrine.*
Second, plaintiffs alleged that the state approved the
facility's reduced visiting hours through the annual inspection and certification procedures.27 Plaintiffs further alleged, on information and belief, that restricted visiting hours
were more economical for both the facility and the state.20
The court analyzed these allegations as the "encourage-

19
20
21
22

23

24

25
26

27
28

Id., Memorandum Opinion (granting defendants* Motion to Dismiss) 11 3-4 (Nov. 18, .1980). See § 4.2.1.2.2
supra.
Id., Memorandum Opinion 11 4-5. See § A2A22.
supra.
ld.f Memorandum Opinion 1 5.
Id., Memorandum Opinion 11 57. The court distinguished Teitelbaum v. Sorenson because it found
that Iowa, unlike Arizona, does not by statute
designate the provision of medical services to the
elderly as a state function. See § 4.2.1.4 supra.
Legal Services Corp. of Iowa v. Bladister, Inc., Civ. A
No. 80-263-C, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 770 (Nov. 1980)
(Clearinghouse No. 29,916) (S.D. Iowa, filed June 24,
1980), Memorandum Opinion, 11 78 (Nov. 18, 1980).
The court explicitly rejected the Teitelbaum holding
that a private nursing home is the functional
equivalent of a company town. See § 4.2.1.2.3 supra.
Legal Services Corp. of Iowa v. Bladister, inc., Civ. A.
No. 80-263-C, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 770 (Nov. 1980)
(Clearinghouse No. 29,916) (S.O. Iowa, filed June 24,
1980), Memorandum Opinion (Jan. 22,1981).
Id-, Memorandum Opinion 1-2. /d., Amended and
Substituted Complaint 11 31-33.
Id., Memorandum Opinion 1-2 (Jan. 22, 1981), citing
Howe v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 667,
670 (S.D. Iowa 1974), which cited Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961).
Id., Amended and Substituted Complaint 1 51.
Id* Amended and Substituted Complaint 1 52c

ment theory" of state action: THhe state's acquiescence in
defendants' imposition of limitations upon visiting hours
through annual inspection and certification procedures
conducted by state agencies encouraged or fostered an atmosphere wherein the private actors were relatively free to
promulgate restrictive policies and practices which functioned to deprive residents of their First Amendment
rights.'™
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, recently
affirmed the dismissal for failure to state a claim of a suit
by the Cape Cod Nursing Home Council and Legal Services
for Cape Cod and Islands, Inc., seeking access to a nursing
home." The court expressly found the company town
theory of state action did not apply1' and suggested that
recognizing constitutionally guaranteed rights of access to
"outsiders . . . could threaten patient care and pose
significant risks to the elderly residents,"** citing a case
discussing union solicitation in hospitals.33

5.2.3

LITIGATION BY STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL

The Massachusetts Attorney General successfully sued
a nursing home that had suspended ail visiting hours "until
further notice*9 because of the facility's desire to prevent
the "flu on the outside" from "coming into our home."34 The
Attorney General filed suit after receiving a call from a
paralegal with Cambridge and Somerville Legal Services
who had attempted to visit two clients at the facility and
was threatened with arrest because of the facility's ban on
all visitors.
The state's case was based on two provisions of the Attorney Generat's Rules and Regulations Relating to Nursing Homes,1* promulgated by the Attorney General under
the state consumer protection law.M
Section 4.1 of these regulations makes it an unfair or
deceptive trade practice for a nursing home
to fail or refuse to permit a resident to associate or
communicate privately, either inside or outside the
nursing home, with persons of his/her choice at
reasonable hours or to permit a resident to receive or
refuse visitors, unless medically contraindicated as
documented by his/her physician in his/her medical
record.1*

29

30
31
32
33
34

35
36

37

Id., Memorandum Opinion 2 (Jan. 22, 1981), citing
Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144 (1970), and Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). Id., Amended and
Substituted Complaint 11 51-54.
Cape Cod Nursing Home Council v. Rambling Rose
Rest Home, No. 81-1379 (2d Cir., Dec. 30,1981) (2d Cir.
1981).
Id., Slip Op. at 3. See § 4.2.1.Z3 supra,
Id. at 6-7.
Eastern Maine Medical Center v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1981).
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. QT Services,
Inc., No. 78-564 (Mass. Sup. CL, Middlesex County, filed Jan. 31, 1978) (order issued Feb. 22, 1978). Letter
from Administrator to All Patients and Their Families
(Jan. 11,1978), Exhibit A to Complaint.
20 CODE OF MASS. REGS. pt. 5 at 55 (1976).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, 1 2(c).

Attorney General's Rules and Regulations Relating to
Nursing Homes, 20 CODE OF MASS. REGS. pt. 5 at 55, §

4.1 (1976).

tivities. Since these regulations govern only the rights of
residents, they are of limited value in dealing with the most
common access problems, which involve the rights of
nonresidents to enter nursing homes. Proposed new regulations in 1980 would have expanded current access requirements by requiring facilities to designate a minimum
of 10 visiting hours per day, by granting ombudsmen and
two persons of the residents' choice unlimited access, and
by ensuring that all visitors be allowed access to residents
during posted visiting hours.44 These regulations were
withdrawn in 1981 by the new administration. 4 '

;tion 4.10 states that is an unfair or deceptive trade prac3 for a nursing home "to fail or refuse to provide access
the nursing home to individuals or representatives of
mmunity groups or of other groups who seek to provide
ial services to residents without charge to the resident at
isonable hours."*
In an interlocutory order,.the court lifted the ban on
iitors and reinstated the previous visiting hours.3* The
eliminary injunction expanded visiting hours for family
id friends.4*

5.2.4

FEDERAL LAWS AND
REGULATIONS

5.2.5

A ideal state access law would include provisions:

Access is a significant issue at the federal level in both
le nursing home ombudsman program and the Conditions
f Participation for Medicare and Medicaid facilities.
5.2.4.1

• Explicitly establishing a right of access for legal services programs, community groups, and other advocates (group or individual) that want to visit, talk
with, and make personal, social, or legal services
available to residents without charge;
• Authorizing such advocates to initiate communications or visits;
• Establishing explicit enforcement merchanisms.

Nursing Home Ombudsman Program

The Comprehensive Older Americans Act Amendments
>f 197841 considerably strengthened the nursing home on>
>udsman program by requiring every state to have such a
>rogram, by giving the program explicit statutory authority
the program had been operated as a model project by the
Commissioner on Aging since 1975), and by specifically
jefining ombudsman functions and responsibilities.42
Under the 1978 Amendments, the states must "establish
procedures for appropriate access" by the ombudsman to
long-term care facilities and to residents' records.44 This
statutory directive provides the impetus for many states to
enact laws and regulations addressing the access issue.
Advocates need to make sure that state laws establishing
ombudsman programs do not inappropriately or inadvertently block access of advocates and community
groups to nursing homes.
5.2.4.2

The District of Columbia's access provision is considered by many advocates to be model legislation. Section
3 of the Health Care Faciiities Regulation states:
(a) The health care facility shall permit members of
community organizations and representatives of
community legal services programs, whose purposes include rendering assistance without
charge to nursing home patients, to have full and
free access to the health care facility in order to:
(1) Visit, talk with, and make personal, social and
legal services available to all patients.
(2) Inform patients of their rights and entitlements,
and their corresponding obligations, under
Federal and District laws by means of distribution of educational materials and discussion in
groups and with individuals.
(3) Assist patients in asserting their legal tights
regarding claims for public assistance, medical
assistance, and social security benefits, as well
as in all other matters in which patients are aggrieved. Assistance may be provided individually, as well as on a group basis, and may include
organizational activity, as well as counseling
and litigation.
(4) Inspect all areas of the health care facility except the living areas of a patient who protests
such inspection. Such authority shall not include the right to examine the business records
of the facility without the consent of the Administrator, nor the clinical record of a patient
without his consent.
(5) Engage in all other methods of assisting, advising, and representing patients so as to extend
to them the full enjoyment of their rights.4*

Conditions of Participation for Long*
Term Care Faciiities Participating in
Medicare and/or Medicaid

Federal regulations governing access appear in the
residents' rights section of the Condition of Participation
for skilled nursing facilities44 and in the standards for intermediate care facilities.4* They guarantee residents'
rights to associate and communicate privately with individuals, to send and receive mail unopened, and to participate in social, religious, and community group ac-

38
39

40
41
42

43
44
45

STATE LAWS

Id. § 4.10.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. QT Services,
Inc., No. 78-564 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Middlesex Co., filed
Jan. 31,1978), Interlocutory Order 1-2 (Feb. 22,1978).
The previous visiting hours were 2 p.m. to 4 p.m. and 6
p.m. to 9 p.m. Id. at 1.
Id., Preliminary Injunction.
Pub. L No. 95-478. 92 Stat. 1535 (1978).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3057g (Supp. Ill 1979). Final regulations implementing the 1978 amendments appear at
45 Fed. Reg. 21,151 (Mar. 31,1980). A program instruction on the ombudsman program was issued on Jan.
19, 1981.
42 U.S.C. § 3027(aK12) (Supp. Ill 1979).
42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1121(kX11), (12) (1980).
Id. §44Z311(i).

46
47
48

51

45 Fed. Reg. 47,368 (July 14, 1980).
46 Fed. Reg. 7,408 (Jan. 23.1981).
No. 74-15, tit. Ill, § 3 (June 14, 1974).

The D C regulation includes the following enforcement provisions.
(a) Any person or representative thereof, who is
damages due to violation of this regulation shall:
1 have a civil cause of action against any person
violating this regulation, and
Z be entitled to recover from any such person:
(i) actual damages
(ii) punitive damages
(ui)a reasonable attorney's fee and litigation
costs reasonably incurred "
A number of states have enacted nursing home access
legislation or regulations *• A new legislative approach to
the access issue that is potentially damaging to the rights
of residents' advocates requires community advocacy
groups to register with a state agency or to receive formal
state approval in some other way before they may visit nursing home residents. Such laws have been enacted in
Michigan*1 and Ohio42 Three problems may result from
registration laws: *
• Groups that have challenged the state may not gain
approval;
• Registration laws may not provide for registration of
independent advocates who are not formally affiliated with advocacy groups; and
• Such laws may constitute a pnor restraint on the
speech of potential visitors, in violation of the first
amendmentM

49
50

Id., tit III, § 1(d)
Fix STAT ANN § 400 022(1Xb) (West Supp 1981); M a
HEALTH CODE ANN art 43, § 565(C)(a)(11) (1980), MICH

COMP LAWS ANN § 333 21763, 21764 (1980), N J STAT
ANN §§ 30 13-3, «4 (1981), OHIO REV CODE ANN § 3721 14

51
52
53

(Page 1980), OKLA. STAT ANN tit 63, § 1-1919 (West
Supp 1981), Wis. STAT ANN § 50 09 (West Supp.
1981-82), Mass. Nursing Home Regs of Att'y Gen , 20
Code of Mass Regs, pt 53 at 55 § 4 1, 10 (1976), Pa,
Long-Term Care Regs § 201 35(cHe)
MICH COMP LAWS ANN §§ 333 21763 21764 (1980).
OHIO REV CODE ANN § 3721 14 (Page 1980).
See § 5.22 supra.
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ADMISSION: DISCF IMINATION AGAINST
MEDICAID RECIPIENTS
AND OTHER POOR PEOPLE
THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION

of many poor people from Medicaid coverage. The problem
is especially severe in states without programs for the
medically needy:1 In these states, many poor people are ineligible for aid under the Medicaid program. Securing nursing home care for non-Medicaid eligible poor people is a second aspect of the access to care and services issue.
Two levels of response to the problem of discriminatory
admissions are necessary. First, voluntary participation by
a facility in the Medicaid program must be held to impose
an obligation to provide care on a nondiscriminatory basis.9
Second, and more broadly, ail facilities must be required to
provide care for poor people because of the state's obligation to provide for the health and welfare of its citizens and
because of the facilities' state-sanctioned monopoly.*
Few litigation strategies have been developed to address
discriminatory admissions problems.7 More success, to
date, has been reported in state legislative and administrative advocacy.* To the extent that discrimination
against Medicaid recipients masks racial discrimination or
discrimination against handicapped persons, additional
strategies, both administrative and litigative, may be used.9
Specific strategies for dealing with contractually-forced
periods of private payment before conversion to Medicaid
are also available.10

ecuring nursing home care and services for poor people
5 want and need such care Is commonly a problem.
lough nursing home placement is not the first or most
•irable option for most older people, it may at times be
;essary and appropriate. Discrimination against poor
>ple, including Medicaid recipients, is all-too-frequent. It
:urs in large part because facilities are able to charge
i/ate-pay residents rates that are higher than those paid
government programs, chiefly Medicaid, for identical
•vices. Avoidance of delay in receiving government pay>nt also motivates providers to prefer a private-pay
enteie. While the problem of discrimination often arises
the context of involuntary transfer of residents who have
hausted their personal financial resources and converted
Medicaid, discrimination at the time of original admis>n is an equally serious concern.
Participation by nursing homes in Medicaid creates few
(ligations under federal law. Generally, the fact of par;ipatlon means only that the facilities will be reimbursed,
i a per capita basis, for the care and services they provide
however many Medicaid recipients they choose to serve.
edicaid participation, in the absence of explicit state
rection, imposes no obligations to provide care for
aecific recipients. Facilities use Medicaid for their own
urposes' and make unilateral (and usually unchallenged)
ecisions whether to admit or refuse Medicaid recipients
eeking admission.
Recently, a number of facilities participating in Medicaid
cross the country have placed clauses in their admissions
ontracts requiring that residents agree to pay for care out
»f private funds (be "private-pay" residents) for a specified
>enod of time (ranging from several months to several
ears) before their conversion to Medicaid will be Mac:epted" by the facility. Maryland sanctions this practice by
rtate law.2
Another problem is that many poor people do not qualify
or Medicaid, even though they lack sufficient financial
esources to pay for nursing home (or other medical) care.
The statutory linkage of Medicaid eligibility with
categorical assistance programs3 results in the exclusion

6.2

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
ADVOCACY

Discrimination against poor people, including Medicaid
recipients, might in fact be racial discrimination or
discrimination against handicapped people. These kinds of
discrimination are prohibited by federal law — Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964" and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,12 respectively - and may be the
subject of administrative complaints to the Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Hill-Burtonu obligations of public and nonprofit facilities may also be the subject of federal administrative advocacy.

6.2.1 TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196414 prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, color, or national origin by pro-

1

See Stitt v. Manor Care, Inc., No. C78-630, [1979-1]
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 1 29,409, (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 24, 1978) 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245 (Aug. 1978)

(Clearinghouse No. 24,702) (Court observed that
facilities participate in Medicaid when they open in
order to develop a good cash flow, then withdraw
from the program when they are able to fill their beds
with residents from the more profitable private-pay
market).
Other facilities restrict use of Medicaid to their
own private-pay residents who spend their money
and need to convert to Medicaid.
2

Mo. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. 45, § 565QaK18Xv) (1981

3

Cum. Supp.).
See § 2.1.2^ supra.

12
13
14
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See §2.1.2.2 supra,
See § 6.4.1 intra.
See § 6.4.2 intra.
See § 6.3 infra,
See § 6.4 infra.
See §§ 6.2.1, 6 ^ 2 , 6.3.2 infra.
See § 6.5 infra.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), Pub. L No. 88-352, § 601, 78
Stat 252 (1964).
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), Pub. L No. 93-112, § 504, 87
Stat. 394 (1973); 45 C.F.R. Part 84 (1980).
42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 2910-1 (1976).
42 U.S.C § 2000d (1976), Pub. L No. 88-352, § 601 78
Stat. 252 (1964).
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN AKD FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
RABBI SAMUEL TEITELBAUM, and
LARRY and LOUISE DIEHL,
Plaintiffs,

)
CIV. NOA 79-199 PHX WEC

vs

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

THEODORE SORENSON, D/3/A
WAITWELL NURSING HOME
Defendant.

The plaintiffs1 motion for preliminary-injunction came
on regularly for hearing at 2 o'clock p.m. on Wednesday, April 11,
1979, with all parties represented by counsel. The Court proceeded to take evidence and testimony and has now considered the
matter, the memoranda and arguments of the parties and now makes
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to
Rule 65(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The plaintiffs in this action arc volunteers
connected with a nursing home patient outjreach project (outreach
project) sponsored by the Arizona Center for Law in the Public
Interest.

The purpose of the program is to-enable residents of

nursing facilities to (1) learn about their rights and benefits,
and (2) receive visitation from persons familiar with the
31

ji problems of the elderly and knowledgeable about the rights of

A \I I f11^???11^ home patients.

(Affidavit of Rit^i Schmidt)

NH/Appendix 2

,1

2.

Defendant Theodore Sorcnson, operates as a sole

proprietorship,Waitwell Nursing Home, 5910 West Northern

2
Avenue, Glcndale, Arizona 85302.

Waitwell is a privately-

3
owned skilled nursing facility licensed by the Arizona Depart-

4
ment of Health Services to provide nursing services to 135

5
patients.

6

Joseph Grabowski is the administrator.
3.

7

On February 8, 1979, the plaintiffs along with

Rita Schmidt, who is the director of the outreach project,

8
9

. visited Waitwell Nursing Home for the purpose of advising the

10

residents about the availability of an Arizona state renter's

11

tax credit or refund.

12

Rita Schmidt were admitted into the facility, they were not

13

permitted to discuss the income tax information with the

14

patients.

15

a follow-up visit to see if the patients had filled out the

16

forms, Mr. Grabowski refused to allow the volunteers to return

17

for that purpose.

When Ms. Schmidt contacted Mr. Grabowski to arrange

4.

18

Although the volunteers along with Ms.

(Testimony of Joseph Grabowski)

Waitwell Nursing Home provides skilled nursing

19

services to its patients.

20

sleep, and carry out their daily activities, including recreatior

21

at the facility.

22

Generally speaking, all of their needs are met through services

23

provided to them at the facility.

24

of the patients are not able to easily leave the facility?

25

many are bedridden.

26

Anderson)

27

5.

The patients eat their meals,

Housekeeping services are also provided.*

The overwhelming percentage

(Testimony of Joseph Grabowski, Gary

The patients at Waitwell Nursing Home are

28

comparable to patients at skilled nursing facilities throughout

29

Arizona.

30

characterized by dependency upon the nursing home staff and

31

administration.

32
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They are elderly and/or infirm and their lives are

The institutional environment in which tihoy

I

and voicing concerns and grievances.

2

physically unable to care for themselves and many are mentally

3

unable to effectively communicate.

4

Gary Anderson)

5

6„

Many of the patients are

(Testimony of Gordon Aldridge,

Patient contact should not be limited to staff

6

of the facility.

7

is essential because patients in an institutional environment

Visitation by persons from outside the facility

8 Jj can lose touch with the world outside of the institution.
9

(Testimony of Gordon Aldridge)

10

7o

11
12
13
14
15
16

outreach project, cannot be effectively administered by t^ie
nursing home staff.

19
20

Patients are frequently intimidated by

staff and it is unrealistic to expect the staff of a facility to
encourage the patients to voice grievances and complaints!.
(Testimony of Gordon Aldridge)
8.

17
18

Advocacyiefforts such as are provided by t^ie
I

Although patients at the facility may at times

become confused or may not be entirely functional, they may still
benefit greatly from visitation.

(Testimony of Mary Ann tinberg)

These patients have the greatest need for outside advocates such
i

21

as the volunteers from the outreach project.

22

Gordon Aldridge)

23

9.

(Testimony of

Waitwell Nursing Home permits a variety of

24

volunteer groups access to the facility,

25

arts and crafts, singing and religious services. Volunteers are

Activities include
i

26
encouraged to bring clothing and other items to patients.

The

27
emphasis of the Waitwell volunteer program is different f£om
28
the emphasis of the outreach project.

(Testimony of Kare^i

29
Gowins)
30
10.

Approximately 80- of the patients at Waitwell

31
Nursing Home are county patients.

These patients are indigent

32
and their care is paid for by Maricopa County.

Approximately

80% of the facility's revenue is derived from Maricopa County.
3
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(Testimony of Joseph Grabowski)

1
2

11*

Maricopa County has a Patient Care Team, composed

3

of a physician, a registered nurse and a social worker, which

4

visits nursing facilities caring for "county" patients.

5

visits each patient in accordance with the medical care plan, in

6

accordance with state regulations or depending upon the need of

7

the patient.

8

of indigent persons in accordance with state regulations and

9

accepted standards of care.

The team

The team monitors and reviews the total medical care

Maricopa County expects that each

10

facility serving county patients will adhere to applicable state

11

regulations and acceptable standards of care with respect to the

12

services which the facility provides to the patient.

13

of Phyllis Biedess)

14

12.

(Affidavit

The plaintiffs and other persons connected with

15

the outreach project desire to return to Waitwell to inform

16

patients of their rights, assist patients in resolving complaints

17

atid aiding patients with other matters of concern to them.

13

(Affidavit of, Rita Schmidt)

19

13. .There is nothing in the record to show that the

20

privacy of the patients will be interfered with in any manner

21

by the plaintiffs' activities.

22
23
24
25

appears that the outreach project operates in a responsible
manner.

28
29

32

(Testimony of Theodore

Sorenson," Gary Anderson)
14.

The visitation o£ the plaintiffs and Rita Schmidt

on February 8, 1979 was not at the request of any patient of
The Waitwell Nursing Home, and was made over the objection of
the defendant.

30
31

Even the defendant had no knowledge of any complaints

concerning the outreach project.

26
27

Based upon the evidence, it*

15.

The patients at The Waitwell Nursing Home are

patients requiring skilled nursing care, which is the highest
level of care which may be provided by nursing homes under Arizond

NH/Appendix 2

4

law, and each patient is under the care of a physician

!
2

16,

5

1.. This action has been properly filed und Qr

The Waitwcll Nursing Home is subject tn «.. <
wu
stringent
3 | regulation by the Arizona Department of Health Service
4 jj
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

6

Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The Court h

1

jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 \ \ A ^
1JA3

And 28

8 Jj U.S.C. S 2201, the Declaratory Judgment Act*
9 "
2. The actions of the defendant restricting
10

interfering with the plaintiffs' communication to tho

11

here was.under color of law within the meaning of 42 M ~ _

12

S 1983.

13

3. Waitwell Nursing Home is the "functions

14

«quivale.'nt
of a town. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 90 LcEd. 265 n o
nal

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

since the facility provides all necessary services to th
dents and they are physically and psychologically co^fi
isolated-from other community activities. See Mid-Hi,^
'
-^S£Qft Legal
Services, Inc. v. G. & U., Inc. 437 F.Supp. 60 (S«De^ v
Folgueras v^ Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. XIQTI*
97
"
l ) . Although
there are several "migrant labor camp* cases in which
courts have found that state action did not exist. *«*.».
' *n those cases
there was an absence of proof that the migrant worv**..
Qrs
^ r e , for
all practical purposes, physically or psychologically
* confined
to the perimeters of the private property. Illinoi- u<
Council v. Camobell Soup, 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. IQTJM
x
*'8)? Agociacion
de Trabajadores v. Green Giant Company, 518 F .2d, Itn /*
4J0
'
—
'
(3rd Cir.
1975) • The private property of Waitwell Nursing \\QmQ *
all the components of a town thus it has become «U£F< i
^iCiently
state-like to fulfill the state-action requirement* *
cnco
**
*or invoking
First Amendment rights.
4.

Additionally, since Waitwell Nursing JIQ

receives a majority of its income from Maricopa Can**
u
—
"tv tor
5

providing care to indigent patients, (2) is extensively regulated,
and (3) where the duty to provide care for indigent persons

is a public .function nndor Arixo»,i law,

tbesn is

sufficient

interdependence between public and private conduct giving rise to
action under color 0 f i a w .

Mathis v. Opportunities Industriali-

zation Center, 545 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1976); Ginn v. Mathews, 533
F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1976).

See Burton v. Wilmington Parking

Authority, 365 U.?, 715, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961).
5.

The Plaintiffs' communication is constitutionally

protected under th<^ i s t and 14th Amendments of the United States
Constitution and m^ y

not

be restricted and conditioned by the

defendant, except that the defendant may place reasonable time,
place and manner restrictions/ Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141.
87 L.Ed. 1119 (1943). Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 83 L.Ed.
1423 (1939).
6.

The denial and abridgement of the plaintiffs'

constitutional rights constitutes irreparable injury.

Schnell v.

City of Chicago, 4Q7 F # 2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Henry .v. Greenville Airport Comn^n.f

2 84

F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1960).

ORDER
Pursuant to the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and

tne

court finding (1) that plaintiffs will

suffer irreparably injury if an injunction is not granted, (2)
that the likelihood Q f any injury to the defendant is remote,
XW

£te plaintiff^

fn22 probably

succeed

ca tte merits,

aad

(4) the public interest is served by granting injunctive relief,
IT IS HfeR£By ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied;

2.

The defendant, his employees, agents and all those

acting, in concert with him, and any successor owner, are hereby
enjoined during the pendency of this action, from directly or

1

indirectly, interfering, obstructing or hampering in any manner

2

visits, meetings, discussions or other communication, between

3 I the plaintiffs and those persons in active concert or participa4

tion with them and patients at Waitwell Nursing Home; except that

5

the defendant may place reasonable time, place and manner rostric-

6

tions on visitations*

7

3.

8

The defendant's motion for a stay of this Order

pending appeal is denied.

9

DONE IN OPEN COURT this

o^

day of dkm</r 1979.

10

n
12

Hpn. Walter E. Craig
//
tinited States District/Judge

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

7
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